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Social-Network Theory and the Diffusion of the 
Search-and-Seizure Exclusionary Rule Among State 
Courts Between Weeks and Wolf † 
Laurence A. Benner,* Robert Bird  & Donald J. Smythe *** 
Abstract 
In light of the Supreme Court’s recent narrowing of the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule in cases like Herring v. United States1 and 
Davis v. United States,2 there is renewed interest in whether state supreme 
courts will maintain or similarly narrow the search and seizure exclusionary 
rule for violations of their own state constitutions. The pattern of early adop-
tions of the exclusionary rule as a matter of state law before it was mandated 
by the federal Constitution may provide interesting insights into how the 
state supreme courts will respond to cases such as Herring and Davis. This 
article uses social-network theory to evaluate the patterns of communication 
and influence across state courts in the diffusion of the search and seizure ex-
clusionary rule as a matter of state constitutional law. During the period 
studied, the Supreme Court made the exclusionary rule mandatory in feder-
al criminal prosecutions for violations of the Fourth Amendment, but had 
not yet ruled that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states. We concep-
tualize the diffusion of the exclusionary rule in state courts as a matter of 
state law as a two-stage process. The first stage concerns whether the issue of 
exclusion of evidence obtained through illegal searches and seizures in viola-
tion of state constitutional law was presented to state supreme courts follow-
ing adoption of the federal exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United States.3 
 
 † Our thanks to Pat McCoy and the participants in the session on “Courts on Trial” at 
the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association in Chicago in May 2010 for help-
ful and supportive comments on an earlier version of this article. Our thanks also go to Michael 
Solomine for helpful comments on an earlier paper, and to Andrea Gable-Mower, Kristen 
Raymond, and Meredith Long for their conscientious research assistance. Of course, we are 
fully responsible for any errors or omissions. 
  Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. 
  Associate Professor of Business Law and Northeast Utilities Chair in Business Eth-
ics, School of Business, University of Connecticut. 
  Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. 
 1. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
 2. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011). 
 3. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
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The second stage concerns whether the state courts adopted the exclusionary 
rule as a matter of state law, before Wolf v. Colorado,4 when the Fourth 
Amendment was made applicable to the states. This article uses logistic re-
gressions to evaluate the pattern of communication and influence among 
state courts in the diffusion of the exclusionary rule at each stage in the pro-
cess. The results are striking. They suggest that precedents by other state su-
preme courts in the same West legal reporting regions were more influential 
in determining whether the question would arise in a particular state than 
precedents by state supreme courts in neighboring states, or the same federal 
circuit regions, or the same census regions. But precedents by other state su-
preme courts in the same federal circuit regions appear to have been more 
influential in determining whether the exclusionary rule would be adopted 
than precedents in neighboring states, the same West reporting regions, or 
the same census regions. These results both corroborate and extend those of 
previous studies. 
  
 
 4. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
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I. Introduction 
Today, the exclusionary rule that bars physical evidence obtained 
through unreasonable search or seizure is applied, albeit with many 
exceptions, in both federal and state criminal prosecutions as a matter 
of federal constitutional law under the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. In the early part of the twentieth centu-
ry, however, the Fourth Amendment had not yet been incorporated 
as part of due process and made applicable to the states under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, there was 
no federal constitutional protection against unreasonable searches 
and seizures that were conducted by state officials acting under the 
color of state law.5 
The states did have longstanding protections against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures in their state constitutions.6 But under an 
equally longstanding common law rule of evidence, a criminal court 
did not inquire into whether physical evidence had been illegally ob-
tained.7 This was viewed as a collateral issue properly dealt with in a 
civil proceeding against the offending trespasser.8 The Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Weeks v. United States,9 excluding physical evidence 
in federal criminal cases because it had been illegally obtained in vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment, thus constituted a dramatic depar-
ture from the common law tradition. It was thus only after the Su-
preme Court adopted the federal exclusionary rule in Weeks that most 
state supreme courts subsequently addressed the issue of whether the 
exclusionary rule should likewise apply to searches and seizures by 
state officers under their state constitutions.10 The new Weeks rule 
immediately engendered controversy, receiving criticism from such 
notable figures as John Henry Wigmore11 and Judge Benjamin 
Cardozo.12 Yet, it was gradually adopted by a number of state courts 
as a matter of state constitutional law. This article uses a new meth-
 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. See 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2183 (4th ed. 
1985). 
 8. Id.; see also People v. Adams, 68 N.E. 636 (N.Y. 1903). 
 9. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 10. See Kenneth Katkin, “Incorporation” of the Criminal Procedure Amendments: The View 
From the States, 84 Neb. L. Rev. 397, 415–16 (2005). 
 11. 8 Wigmore, supra note 7, § 2184a & n.1. 
 12. See People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587–89 (1926). 
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odology drawn from social-network theory to evaluate the forces that 
generated and facilitated the diffusion of the exclusionary rule as a 
matter of state constitutional law after Weeks, but before the Supreme 
Court made the Fourth Amendment applicable to the states in Wolf 
v. Colorado.13 
We believe that the study of the diffusion of new legal innova-
tions makes an important contribution to our knowledge about the 
law. Indeed, one of the characteristics of the law that makes it so in-
teresting to study, and yet so difficult to understand, is that it is con-
stantly changing and evolving. As a matter of case law, for instance, it 
is not enough to know the rule that courts have previously applied. 
Attorneys who are advising their clients often need to evaluate the 
possibility that the courts will overrule their precedents and apply a 
new rule in some future case. On a question of state law in the Unit-
ed States, for example, there might be a majority rule, a minority 
rule, and a direction or pattern to the way the law is changing—in 
other words, a trend in the law. If the minority rule is the trend, then 
at some point it might become the majority rule. The fact that adop-
tion of a new rule by the courts of one state might also influence 
courts in other states that follow the old majority rule creates uncer-
tainty. The possibility of such changes in the law—or “legal innova-
tions”—makes the practice of law an especially challenging profes-
sion. 
Ideally, therefore, an attorney should know more than simply the 
“law on the books”—she should also know about any trends in the 
law. Even a single new precedent might persuade the courts in her 
state to change an existing rule. That is why so much time in law 
school is devoted to thinking about the alternatives to the law on the 
books and debating the relative merits of alternative legal rules. In 
her role as counselor to her clients, a good attorney should be able to 
track the direction and pattern of any changes in the law and advise 
her clients about their legal risks under these trends. 
A good attorney should also be able to assess whether the courts 
 
 13. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). The exclusionary rule was made mandatory 
upon the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961). We focus on the period between 
Weeks and Wolf because after the Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule as a matter of 
federal constitutional law in Weeks, the question arose in almost all states as a matter of state 
constitutional law. Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion in Wolf indeed surveyed the state cases 
that had addressed the Weeks doctrine, which, by then, had diffused among the states, as a mat-
ter of state law alone, as widely as it ever would. 
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in her jurisdiction might accept a claim based on the trend toward a 
change in the existing legal rule. Indeed, social and political reform-
ers also have an interest in understanding the direction of trends in 
the law and any patterns in the way the law changes. If agents of 
change want to allocate their time and resources to promote legal re-
form in the most effective way possible, they would clearly benefit 
from having a better understanding of where they should challenge 
the status quo and establish a new precedent so as to have the most 
influence upon other courts in their own or other jurisdictions. 
Given that changes in the law are so frequent and important, it is 
surprising that more systematic empirical research has not been de-
voted to understanding the underlying patterns of diffusion of legal 
innovations. Indeed, developments and changes in the law are rarely 
a matter of happenstance. They are a product of underlying social 
forces and dynamics that operate through legal institutions and the 
human actors that work within them. Of course, traditional historical 
studies have often been directed at understanding the causes and con-
sequences of legal change. Unfortunately, it is often difficult to draw 
the kind of generalizations from such studies that will help to serve as 
a guide in predicting the path of future developments and changes in 
the law. Indeed, one of the great virtues of traditional historical 
scholarship is that it often has identified what was unique about a 
particular historical phenomenon rather than how it obeyed a similar 
pattern to other phenomena of the same type. For generalizations 
that will have predictive value, the social sciences are likely to be 
more availing. 
Fortunately, there is a large and growing social science literature 
on the diffusion of innovations.14 This literature has generally drawn 
on insights from economics, political science, and sociology to create 
what some scholars consider a new field—the field of diffusion stud-
ies.15 The fundamental idea is to recognize that most innovations dif-
fuse when they are voluntarily adopted by particular actors. The ac-
tors might be individuals, business firms, or state and national 
governments—in fact, almost any person or social institution that 
 
 14. See generally Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (5th ed. 2003) 
(providing a classic introduction to and overview of the social science literature on diffusion). 
 15. Id.; see also Everett M. Rogers et al., Complex Adaptive Systems and the Diffusion of In-
novations, 10 Innovation J., no. 3, 2005, at 4, http://www.innovation.cc/volumes-issues/rogers 
-adaptivesystem7final.pdf (giving a brief history of diffusion studies). 
 97]  Social-Network Theory: Search-and-Seizure Exclusionary Rule 
 103 
makes decisions.16 The innovations can be of almost any type, but 
most studies have focused on innovations such as the adoption of new 
production techniques by business firms, or new agricultural methods 
by farmers, or new prescription practices by physicians.17 One of the 
basic premises of the field is that the social context—in particular, the 
social network—within which the actors make their decisions about 
whether to adopt innovations is of primary importance.18 The field of 
diffusion studies thus overlaps heavily with the emerging field of so-
cial-network theory. 
 Although social-network methods are being used with increasing 
frequency in the social sciences, legal scholars have only recently be-
gun to explore the possibilities.19 In one early study, Donald Smythe 
used social-network methods to study the diffusion of the Uniform 
Sales Act across the states from 1906–47.20 He found that “neighbor-
hood” effects were particularly important in the enactment of the 
Uniform Sales Act by state legislatures.21 He also found some evi-
dence that transportation networks were influential,22 and, in a sub-
sequent study, attempted to evaluate the effects of the national trans-
portation network on the legislatures’ decisions.23 In some cases the 
effect seemed quite strong. To our knowledge, Robert Bird and 
Donald Smythe were the first to use social-network methods to ex-
amine the diffusion of new legal rules made by judicial decisions. 
They used social-network methods to study the diffusion of wrong-
ful-discharge laws across the states in the 1970s and 1980s.24 They 
subsequently used social-network methods to study the diffusion of 
the strict liability rule in tort for manufacturing defects in the 1960s 
and 1970s.25 Both of these studies found a particularly interesting re-
 
 16. See infra text accompanying note 166. 
 17. See infra text accompanying note 164; see also Rogers et al., supra note 15, at 4. 
 18. Rogers et al., supra note 15, at 4. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. Donald J. Smythe, Transaction Costs, Neighborhood Effects, and the Diffusion of the Uni-
form Sales Act, 1906–48, 4 Rev. L. & Econ. 341 (2008). 
 21. Id. at 342. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Donald J. Smythe, Why Was the Uniform Sales Act Adopted in Some States but not 
Others? (Mar. 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the International Society for 
New Institutional Economics), http://extranet.isnie.org/uploads/isnie2008/smythe.pdf. 
 24. Robert Bird & Donald J. Smythe, The Structure of American Legal Institutions and the 
Diffusion of Wrongful-Discharge Laws, 1978–99, 42 Law & Soc’y Rev. 833 (2008). 
 25. Robert Bird & Donald J. Smythe, Social Network Analysis and the Diffusion of the Strict 
Liability Rule for Manufacturing Defects, 1963–87, 37 Law & Soc. Inquiry 565 (2012). 
 BYU Journal of Public Law   [Vol. 27 
104 
sult: the federal circuit regions appeared to play an important role in 
the diffusion processes, even though both the wrongful-discharge 
laws and the strict liability rule were new legal rules adopted by state 
courts26 as a matter of state law.27 As Bird and Smythe have ex-
plained, these findings suggest that the administrative structure of the 
federal court system may play an important role in the development 
of state laws, even though Erie v. Tompkins28 and succeeding Supreme 
Court cases have attempted to separate and clarify the lines of state 
and federal judicial power in order to preserve federalism in the 
United States.29 
The Bird and Smythe studies were limited, however, in a number 
of ways. First, they focused on the diffusion of new private laws. 
There is no guarantee that the patterns evident in the diffusion of 
new private laws would be observed in the diffusion of new public 
laws. Second, the two Bird and Smythe studies focused on new judi-
cially created rules that diffused over roughly the same period—
primarily the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. There is no guarantee that the 
patterns they found would be observed over a different period. Third, 
as Bird and Smythe explained, the evolution of new state legal rules 
might depend in subtle ways upon the decisions of different actors 
within the legal system at different stages in the legal process.30 Un-
fortunately, in their studies they were unable to draw any inferences 
about the influences on different actors at various stages in the diffu-
sion process. Further studies using richer data would be necessary to 
identify more nuanced patterns in the diffusion of new judicial rules. 
Finally, Bird and Smythe’s results could have simply been a conse-
quence of “noise” in the data—peculiarities unique to the particular 
 
 26. Although judges do not technically “make” laws, as a practical matter they do change 
the law through interpretation by adopting new legal rules that govern how disputes are adjudi-
cated. The exclusionary rule is a classic example of such a judge-made law. 
 27. Bird & Smythe, supra note 24, at 835–36; Bird & Smythe, supra note 25, at 581–84. 
 28. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that there is no federal common 
law; rather, in the absence of any controlling state or federal statute, a federal court exercising 
diversity jurisdiction is to apply the common law of the state in which it sits). 
 29. For a then-contemporary interpretation of Tompkins as playing an important clarify-
ing role in understanding federalism, see Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court 
at the October Terms, 1937 and 1938, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 579, 610 (1940) (“The Court’s decision to 
cut through this tangle of inconsistent purposes and flatly to reverse a discredited policy [creat-
ed by Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842)] clarifies and refines the working theory of federalism. It 
terminates the scandal of dual, conflicting rules of decision wherever it survived.”). 
 30. See Bird & Smythe, supra note 24, at 838–41. 
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decisions and rules they studied over a particular period—or simply a 
spurious statistical correlation. One point of wide agreement among 
social scientists is that empirical studies should be replicated whenev-
er possible, and the rationale for replication is just as compelling 
when social scientific methods are applied to the law.31 
This article attempts to redress some of the limitations of the ear-
lier studies by applying social-network methods to examine the diffu-
sion of the search and seizure exclusionary rule as a matter of state 
constitutional law. The time period studied begins when the U.S. 
Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule for violations of the 
Fourth Amendment by federal authorities in Weeks v. United States32 
and ends the year the Court made the Fourth Amendment (but not 
the exclusionary rule) applicable to the states in Wolf v. Colorado.33 
The state supreme court decisions addressing the exclusionary rule 
during this period were rendered from 1915 to 1936. 
Today there is a renewed interest in state constitutional criminal 
procedure.34 We hope this article will add to our understanding of 
the manner in which state constitutional criminal procedures 
changed in the early twentieth century. Beyond that, however, we al-
so hope it adds to our more general understanding of how new legal 
rules spread throughout the legal system. In addition, the rich data 
created by the exclusionary rule cases allow this article to expand up-
on Bird and Smythe’s previous studies. This allows us to penetrate 
some of the layers in the diffusion process that the previous studies 
were unable to address. Specifically, we are able to distinguish be-
tween the factors that facilitated whether the question about the ex-
clusionary rule “bubbled up” to the state supreme courts in the first 
place, and the factors that may have influenced the state supreme 
courts to adopt the rule in a case that reached them. 
Our study provides some interesting results. First, it appears that 
whether the issue of exclusion due to illegal search and seizure arose 
at all in a particular state correlates strongly with whether an exclu-
sionary rule case had been previously decided by another jurisdiction 
 
 31. Except for experimental research, exact replication is generally not possible in the 
social sciences. Nonetheless, studies that test the same hypothesis on different data sets are of-
ten possible and they also help to verify the results. 
 32. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 33. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
 34. See, e.g., Barry Latzer, State Constitutional Criminal Law, at vii (1995). 
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in that state’s West Regional Reporter.35 Indeed, previous judicial 
decisions reported within a state’s West Regional Reporter had more 
influence on whether the question would arise in any particular state 
than decisions by other state supreme courts in neighboring states, 
the same federal circuit regions, or the same census regions. This 
makes sense in the days before computerized access to decisions via 
Westlaw, LexisNexis, and the Internet. Knowledge about exclusion-
ary rule decisions in other states was more readily available to attor-
neys in their regional West reporters. 
But when cases raising the exclusionary rule reached the state su-
preme courts we found that decisions adopting the rule by other state 
supreme courts in the same federal circuit regions appeared to be 
more persuasive than decisions by other state supreme courts in the 
same West legal reporting regions, neighboring states, or the same 
census regions. It is not immediately apparent why the federal circuit 
regions might play a role in the diffusion of the exclusionary rule 
among state courts. A federal court, moreover, would not have habeas 
corpus jurisdiction to hear a claim of a state prisoner concerning ille-
gal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment because that 
amendment did not apply to the states during this time period. In any 
event, this result corroborates one of the main results from Bird and 
Smythe’s earlier diffusion studies that used the same social-network 
methods.36 The corroboration of those results lends some further 
credence to the conclusion that there are important patterns of com-
munication and influence between federal and state court systems 
that we do not fully understand. The administrative structure of the 
federal courts may have left an important imprint on the pattern of 
communication and influence across state courts.37 
In the next section of the article, we present an overview of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the exclusionary rule. In the 
third section, we present a discussion of social-network theory and its 
application to diffusion studies. In the fourth section, we discuss the 
 
 35. West Publishing’s National Reporter System groups states into seven regions: Atlan-
tic, North Eastern, North Western, Pacific, South Eastern, South Western, and Southern. De-
cisions of state appellate courts are published in a reporter for each region. Morris L. Cohen 
& Kent C. Olson, Legal Research In A Nutshell (8th ed. 2003) (describing the West re-
porting regions). 
 36. These studies also found that the federal circuit regions played a significant role in 
diffusion of private laws. See infra Part V. 
 37. See infra Parts V–VI. 
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data we compiled for this study, and in the fifth section we explain 
our empirical methods. In the sixth and seventh sections, we present 
our results and conclusions. 
II. The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule 
A. Common-Law Antecedents 
Fourth Amendment protections have deep roots in the common 
law.38 Some of the most influential cases supporting a right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures in England arose from at-
tempts to censor the speech of dissenters.39 English kings had estab-
lished the practice of granting a monopoly to royally favored print-
ers.40 Under its charter of incorporation, this guild of printers was 
granted the power to search, seize, and destroy all unlicensed presses 
to enforce its monopoly, and to confiscate seditious and heretical 
publications.41 By 1636, the infamous Star Chamber was issuing what 
were referred to as “general” search warrants that authorized ap-
pointed “messengers” to search for and seize any books or printed 
matter suspected to be libelous of church or state.42 In contrast to a 
search warrant to recover stolen property that required probable 
cause sworn to under oath,43 such general warrants required no 
 
 38. See, e.g., Semayne’s Case, (1604) 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B.) 195 (recognizing the right 
of a homeowner to defend his or her house against unlawful entry, and also recognizing appro-
priate officers’ authority to enter upon notice in order to arrest or execute the king’s process). 
See generally William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment, Origins and Original 
Meaning 602–1791, at part II–VI (2009); Thomas N. McInnis, The Evolution of the 
Fourth Amendment 15–20 (2009). 
 39. See Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (C.P.) 812–13 (declaring a general 
warrant was unlawful because it authorized the king’s agents to search at their discretion and 
thus lacked the established common law safeguards, i.e., justification, in the form of a sworn 
declaration under oath that illegal contraband was in fact located in the particular place to be 
searched); see also Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P.). 
 40. Cuddihy, supra note 38, at 59. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 61. 
 43. Sir Matthew Hale, Chief Justice of the Kings Bench wrote: 
[Warrants for stolen property] are not to be granted without oath made before the 
justice of a felony committed, and that the party complaining hath probable cause to 
suspect they are in such a house or place, and do shew his reasons of such suspicion. 
And therefore I do take it, that a general warrant to search in all suspected places is 
not good, but only to search in such particular places, where the party assigns before 
the justice his suspicion and the probable cause thereof, for these warrants are judi-
cial acts, and must be granted upon examination of the fact. 
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sworn justification for the search of any particular place.44 After 1640 
and the overthrow of King Charles I, the power of search and seizure 
was exercised by the English parliament to silence dissenters using 
the same type of general warrant.45 Englishmen challenged the issu-
ance of such general warrants on the grounds that they conferred un-
bridled discretion on those authorized to conduct them, and in 1765 
in Entick v. Carrington,46 a general warrant to search for libel was de-
clared illegal in England as being contrary to English common law. 
Entick v. Carrington would establish an important precedent for 
the American colonies. During the colonial era, the English parlia-
ment enacted a number of statutes that empowered government offi-
cials to search for and seize goods that had been imported without 
customs duties being paid.47 In England, the Act of Frauds in 1662 
authorized customs officers through a writ of assistance to command 
officials and virtually anyone in the kingdom to assist them in search-
ing private property for goods upon which duties had not been 
paid.48 This provision was then applied to the American colonies by 
the Act of Frauds of 1696.49 A writ of assistance operated like a gen-
eral warrant in that no justification had to be shown or sworn to in 
order for the customs officer to search a particular home or shop.50 
This became a cause of great resentment in the colonies. For exam-
ple, the Molasses Act of 1733 imposed prohibitive tariffs on sugar and 
molasses imported from non-British colonies in the West Indies. 
While enforcement was initially lax, after England and France went 
to war in the 1750s, customs officers used the writs of assistance to 
gain entry into the homes, shops and storehouses of American colo-
 
2 Matthew Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae: The History of the Pleas of the 
Crown 150 (W.A. Stokes & E. Ingersoll, eds., R.H. Small 1847) (1736). 
 44. Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. 807. 
 45. Cuddihy, supra note 38, at 151–52. 
 46. Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. 807. 
 47. The Court of Exchequer was empowered to issue a writ to a customs officer, who 
could, with a constable or even the aid of any other nearby subject, enter “any House, Shop, 
Cellar, Warehouse or Room or other Place and, in Case of Resistance, to break open [d]oors, 
[c]hests, [t]runks, and other packages, there to seize” any prohibited and uncustomed goods. 
Andrew E. Taslitz, Reconstructing the Fourth Amendment, A History of Search 
and Seizure, 1789–1868, at 32 (2006). 
 48. See William J. Stutz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 Yale L.J. 393, 
404 (1995). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 405. 
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nists for the purpose of seeking out illegal imports from the French 
and Dutch colonies.51 
These writs continued in force until the sovereign under whom 
they had been issued died.52 In 1761, James Otis sought unsuccessful-
ly to enjoin the issuance of new writs after the death of King George 
II53 calling them “monsters in the law” reminiscent of Star Chamber 
tyranny and “instruments of slavery” which placed “the liberty of eve-
ry man in the hands of every petty officer.”54 The abuse of the power 
to engage in search and seizure thus contributed to the tensions be-
tween the colonists and the English Crown and led to public demon-
strations as well as legal challenges to the Crown’s exercise of author-
ity.55 
Immediately after declaring their independence, eight states56 in-
cluded provisions in their state constitutions guaranteeing their citi-
zens’ rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.57 State con-
stitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures 
thus pre-date the federal constitutional protections in the Fourth 
Amendment. Indeed, the states’ concerns about the lack of such pro-
tections in the proposed federal constitution figured prominently in 
the ratification debates.58 Ultimately, of course, James Madison’s 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 406. 
 53. Id. 
 54. James Otis, Argument before the Boston Superior Court (Feb. 1761) in Massachu-
setts Spy, Apr. 29, 1773, and Israel Keith’s Pleadings, Arguments, &c., Quincy’s Reports 479 
(Horace Grace, ed.), reprinted in M. H. Smith, Appendix J: John Adams’s “Abstract” of The 
Writs of Assistance Cases 552–54 (1978). 
 55. McInnis, supra note 38, at 18–19. Sentiments expressing a need for freedom from 
unreasonable searches and seizures also appeared in The Rights of the Colonists and a List of 
Infringements and Violations of Rights in 1772. Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A 
Documentary History 205–06 (1971); McInnis, supra note 38, at 5 (“Ratification of the 
amendment ‘was not a pedantic exercise, but [done] to protect an almost sacred right that the 
colonists felt about their privacy, particularly the privacy of their homes, but also their persons, 
businesses, and other private premises.’” (citing Phillip A. Hubbart, Making Sense of 
Search and Seizure Law: A Fourth Amendment Handbook 77 (2005))). 
 56. The states in order of adoption include Virginia (1776), Delaware (1776), Pennsyl-
vania (1776), Maryland (1776), North Carolina (1776), Vermont (1777), Massachusetts (1780), 
and New Hampshire (1784). McInnis, supra note 38, at 19. 
 57. See also McInnis, supra note 38, at 17 (“For Americans during the founding era the 
possible abuses of governmental power concerning search and seizure were not distant or re-
mote fears. Americans had examples of abuses from the colonial era which they could point to 
in order to justify the need for strong limits on the power of the government to conduct search-
es and seizures.”). 
 58. See id. at 19. 
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proposed Bill of Rights was adopted and thereafter provided constitu-
tional protections against all unreasonable searches and seizures by 
the federal government.59 The protection against unreasonable 
search and seizure thus operated at two levels. State constitutions 
protected against infringement by the states, the federal constitution 
protected against infringement by the federal government. 
B. Early American Cases 
In spite of the federal and state constitutional protections, Ameri-
can courts were initially slow to regulate government searches and 
seizures. For one thing, they did not initially exclude evidence that 
was obtained through an illegal search.60 The exclusionary rule 
would not be applied until the early twentieth century.61 Moreover, 
criminal cases were generally a matter of state law, and the Supreme 
Court held in an early case that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the 
states.62 Because the Court held the Bill of Rights inapplicable to the 
states, federal courts had little to say about searches and seizures early 
in the history of the republic.63 The Supreme Court thus decided on-
ly a few Fourth Amendment cases during the entire nineteenth cen-
tury.64 Boyd v. United States,65 the most important Supreme Court 
case that addressed Fourth Amendment rights during that period was 
not a typical criminal case, but rather an in rem proceeding to obtain 
forfeiture of goods allegedly imported without paying proper duties. 
In Boyd, a dispute arose between the federal government and 
Boyd over the duty-free importation of French plate glass windows 
 
 59. See id. at 19–20 (an amendment to Madison’s proposal introduced by Egbert Benson 
might have limited the federal protections to general warrants but it was rejected). See also 1 
Annals of Cong. 754 (1790). 
 60. See Bradford Wilson, The Origins and Development of the Federal Rule of Exclusion, 18 
Wake Forest L. Rev. 1073, 1074 (1982) (“Evidence obtained in the course of an illegal search 
and seizure always has been admitted in England and universally was admitted in American 
courts for more than a century after the Revolution.”); see also People v. Adams, 68 N.E. 636, 
638 (1903). 
 61. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 62. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 248 (1833); Kathryn R. Urbonya, Fourth 
Amendment Federalism? The Court’s Vacillating Mistrust and Trust of State Search and Seizure 
Laws, 35 Seton Hall L. Rev. 911, 961 (2005). 
 63. See McInnis, supra note 38, at 21; Urbonya, supra note 62, at 961. 
 64. McInnis, supra note 38, at 21. 
 65. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
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used in construction of a federal courthouse.66 The government 
maintained Boyd imported far more than was needed for the project 
and brought a civil action seeking forfeiture of the excess crates of 
glass upon which no duty had been paid. The trial court ordered 
Boyd to turn over invoices showing the amount of plate glass that had 
been imported and based upon this evidence the jury returned a ver-
dict in the government’s favor.67 On appeal, the Supreme Court held: 
[A] compulsory production of the private books and papers of the 
owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit is compelling 
him to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search 
and seizure—and an unreasonable search and seizure—within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.68 
While Boyd’s Fourth Amendment ruling had been based on the 
belief that it was unreasonable to search for and seize mere papers for 
use as evidence (a ruling later overturned in Warden v. Hayden69), the 
exclusion of evidence was based upon the Fifth Amendment’s ban on 
use at trial of compelled testimony. The exclusionary rule crafted by 
the Boyd decision thus had limited application. The general rule that 
a court would not take notice of how physical evidence was obtained 
still applied unless the owner of the property was compelled by a 
court order to turn it over or had submitted to a search warrant.70 
The Court did not enunciate the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule in its current form until 1914 in Weeks v. United States.71 
C. Mechanisms for Enforcing Fourth Amendment Protections 
Once a court has determined that particular government action 
constitutes a search or seizure, Fourth Amendment protections apply. 
The text of the Fourth Amendment declares that no warrant shall is-
sue but upon probable cause and warrantless searches or seizures are 
 
  66. Id. at 617. 
  67. Id. at 618. 
 68. Id. at 634–35. 
 69. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). 
 70. See Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904) (distinguishing Boyd on the ground that 
the search warrant was not directed at the defendant). The Fifth Amendment basis for exclusion 
was later abandoned, and in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Court held that 
where an officer in good faith relies upon a search warrant, evidence will not be excluded even 
if the search warrant was invalid. 
 71. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 BYU Journal of Public Law   [Vol. 27 
112 
presumptively unconstitutional unless one of the many exceptions 
crafted by the Supreme Court applies.72 Indeed, the vast majority of 
searches and seizures are warrantless.73 The Supreme Court has, for 
example, carved out a substantial body of exceptions to the warrant 
requirement for searches and seizures based upon probable cause and 
conducted under exigent circumstances.74 It has also carved out a 
large number of exceptions to the warrant requirement for searches 
and seizures that are reasonable even though there may not be exi-
gent circumstances or probable cause.75 In the absence of such an ex-
ception, however, a warrant and probable cause are required. 
In order to protect Fourth Amendment rights against such viola-
tions, some enforcement mechanism is necessary, but the precise 
scope of that mechanism has always been controversial in criminal 
cases. Those whose Fourth Amendment rights are violated by state 
officials may of course seek damages under a statutory cause of action 
for violation of civil rights.76 Those whose Fourth Amendment rights 
are violated by federal officials may seek damages under a judicially 
created common law action known as a Bivens action.77 Nonetheless, 
such civil rights actions are of limited use in enforcing Fourth 
Amendment rights. A state governmental entity cannot be sued under 
the federal statute unless it is shown that the entity had a custom or 
 
 72. See Ronald J. Allen et al., Constitutional Criminal Procedure: An Exami-
nation of Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and Related Areas 609–828 (3d ed. 
1995). 
 73. See id. at 671. 
 74. See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298–99 (concluding that warrant not required in a case in-
volving hot pursuit where it would permit destruction of evidence or endanger the lives of po-
lice or others); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155–56 (1925) (establishing an exception 
to the warrant requirement for searches and seizures of automobiles which are readily mobile). 
 75. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (suspicionless stop of 
automobiles at sobriety check point permissible); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 
543 (1976) (suspicionless stop of automobiles at immigration check point permissible); Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (warrantless stop and frisk is permissible if police officer has reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity and reasonably believes the person may be armed and dangerous). 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”). 
 77. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 390 (1971) (finding 
that despite the absence of any statutory authority, tort actions may be brought against federal 
officials by persons seeking damages for violations of their Fourth Amendment rights). 
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practice of engaging in such violations,78 and attorneys’ fees cannot 
be recovered against a governmental entity if the plaintiff is success-
ful in bringing the action only against officials in their personal ca-
pacity.79 In many cases it is also very difficult for the plaintiff to prove 
the type of substantial damages sufficient to give attorneys an incen-
tive to bring such suits.80 Most scholars and courts agree that if the 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures is to be enforced, there is little effective alternative to the ex-
clusionary rule.81 
D. The Weeks Exclusionary Rule 
The Supreme Court of the United States first enunciated the ex-
clusionary rule as we know it today in a federal criminal case, Weeks 
v. United States.82 Weeks was arrested at his place of employment and 
charged with using the mail to promote illegal gambling.83 His home 
was subsequently searched without a warrant and incriminating let-
ters and other documents were discovered.84 Before trial, Weeks 
moved for the return of the illegally seized items, but the court de-
clined the motion with respect to the letters that were used as evi-
dence against him.85 On appeal, the Supreme Court framed the issue 
as whether the defendant’s letters and correspondence could be re-
tained and used as evidence in a criminal prosecution where they had 
been “seized in his house in his absence and without his authority, by 
a United States marshal holding no warrant for his arrest and none 
for the search of his premises.”86 
The Court distinguished these circumstances from warrantless 
searches conducted incident to a lawful arrest and held that exclusion 
was required.87 If “private documents” could illegally be seized and 
 
 78. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
 79. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 164 (1985) (attorneys’ fees cannot be recovered 
from a governmental entity when government employees are sued in their personal capacities). 
 80. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986) (compensatory 
damages based on the jury’s assessment of the importance of the constitutional rights violated 
are impermissible). 
 81. Allen et al., supra note 72, at 902–76. 
 82. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
  83. Id. at 386 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. at 388. 
 86. Id. at 393. 
  87. Id. at 398. 
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used in evidence against the defendant, the Court observed, “the pro-
tection of the Fourth Amendment, declaring his right to be secure 
against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and . . . might as 
well be stricken from the Constitution.”88 As for the officials who 
acted under color of law, the Court concluded that it need not in-
quire into any remedy against them since the Fourth Amendment 
was not directed against individual misconduct.89 
 By ruling that the trial court should have granted the defendant’s 
pre-trial motion to return his property taken as a direct result of the 
unlawful invasion of his home without a warrant, the Court spawned 
the exclusionary rule, which is now the Court’s primary method for 
deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights. Weeks was, howev-
er, a federal case. Most criminal cases then, as now, were brought in 
state courts for violation of state criminal laws. Weeks did not reach 
them because it did not address whether the Fourth Amendment or 
the exclusionary rule would apply against state officials. The Supreme 
Court continued to clarify the scope of the exclusionary rule in feder-
al cases during the next several decades.90 It did not, however, hold 
that the Fourth Amendment applied to state government officials act-
ing under color of state law until 1949,91 and it did not require the 
states to adopt the exclusionary rule until 1961.92 During this period, 
the states developed their own jurisprudence to address unreasonable 
searches and seizures under their state constitutions. 
E. Applying Federal Constitutional Protections to the States 
Before the Fourteenth Amendment it was clear that the Bill of 
Rights did not apply to the states. In Barron v. Baltimore,93 the Su-
preme Court held that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
did not apply to takings by state governments and, more generally, 
 
 88. Id. at 392–93. 
 89. Id. at 398. 
 90. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939) (all derivative evidence orig-
inally discovered through an illegal search is inadmissible); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 
20, 32 (1925) (searches conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable, unless court-
approved exceptions apply); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (the exclusionary rule 
only applies to actions of government officials); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. Unites States, 251 
U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (the exclusionary rule not only applies to direct evidence seized as a result 
of an illegal search but also evidence or knowledge found as a result of such a search). 
 91. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949). 
 92. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
 93. Baron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833). 
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that the Bill of Rights “contain no expression indicating an intention 
to apply them to the state governments.”94 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment subsequently changed the constitutional landscape by providing 
that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or proper-
ty, without due process of law.”95 In Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. 
Chicago, the Supreme Court applied the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to a taking of the railroad’s property without 
expressly stating that the clause incorporated the takings clause of the 
Fifth Amendment against the states.96 In Gitlow v. New York, howev-
er, the Court expressly ruled that First Amendment freedoms were 
incorporated within the meaning of the term “due process,” stating: 
“[F]reedom of speech and of the press . . . are among the fundamental 
personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.”97 
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court proceeded to selectively 
incorporate other specific protections in the Bill of Rights and make 
them applicable against the states.98 The Court did not incorporate 
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, howev-
er, until 1949 in Wolf v. Colorado.99 In Wolf, the Supreme Court 
treated the exclusionary rule as a device of judicial creation rather 
than a constitutionally mandated remedy.100 Thus, even though the 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states, the ex-
clusionary rule was still not mandated as a constitutionally required 
remedy for violation of the right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.101 
F. The Exclusionary Rule under State Constitutions 
1. Methodological considerations 
Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion in Wolf provided a survey 
 
 94. Id. at 250. 
 95. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 96. Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233–34 (1897). 
 97. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 98. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296 (1940); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); 
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
 99. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
 100. See id. at 28–33. 
 101. See id. at 31–33. 
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of state court decisions that had addressed the issue of whether to 
adopt an exclusionary rule as a matter of state constitutional law. Be-
fore the Supreme Court’s adoption of the Weeks exclusionary rule in 
federal cases in 1914, the issue had arisen in twenty-seven states.102 
Iowa’s Supreme Court was the only state that had excluded evidence 
secured through an unlawful search or seizure before Weeks.103 After 
Weeks, all of the twenty-seven states that had already ruled on the 
question of the search and seizure exclusionary rule revisited the is-
sue.104 As Justice Frankfurter characterized the case law, ten of these 
states overruled their previous decisions and adopted the exclusionary 
rule,105 and sixteen upheld their previous decisions that had rejected 
the rule.106 Iowa, according to Frankfurter, continued to follow its 
previous decision adopting the exclusionary rule. As discussed below, 
we think Justice Frankfurter’s analysis was incorrect. 
Justice Frankfurter observed that twenty other states addressed 
the question whether to adopt the exclusionary rule for the first time 
after Weeks.107 Of these twenty states, six adopted the exclusionary 
rule and fourteen rejected it.108 Actually, as explained below, our re-
search shows that only sixteen states had adopted an exclusionary rule 
between Weeks and Wolf. Thirty states had rejected Weeks, Rhode Is-
land had not addressed the issue, and Oregon had come to no defini-
tive conclusion. 
We think Justice Frankfurter mischaracterized Iowa law by indi-
cating that it had adhered to its prior formulation of the Weeks doc-
trine. Justice Frankfurter cited State v. Rowley109 in support of this 
characterization.110 While the Rowley court initially followed its earli-
er precedent, it subsequently withdrew that opinion on a motion for 
rehearing and reversed its position by rejecting Weeks based on an in-
tervening case.111 In the intervening case, State v. Tonn,112 the Iowa 
 
 102. Id. at 29. 
 103. See id. at 34 tbl.B. 
 104. See id. at 29, 36–38 tbls.F, G & H. 
 105. Id. at 36–37 tbl.F. 
 106. Id. at 37–38 tbl.G. 
 107. Id. at 29. 
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 109. State v. Rowley, 195 N.W. 881 (Iowa 1923). 
 110. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 38 tbl.H. 
 111. See Rowley, 195 N.W. at 979. 
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Supreme Court noted disenchantment with both Boyd v. United 
States113 and Weeks because “[t]he due enforcement of criminal law 
would be most seriously handicapped in many instances, if not wholly 
crippled, by a strict adherence” to the Weeks rule.114 The Court held 
that evidence taken from defendant’s suitcase without a search war-
rant was properly admitted.115 Iowa had therefore rejected the exclu-
sionary rule by the time Wolf applied the Fourth Amendment to the 
states. As the Supreme Court of Iowa has more recently observed, 
this remained the law in Iowa until Mapp v. Ohio.116 
We also have another point of disagreement with Justice Frank-
furter, that is, in his characterization of the law in Oregon as having 
rejected the Weeks exclusionary rule.117 Justice Frankfurter cited State 
v. Folkes118 in support of his characterization.119 But upon a careful 
reading of Folkes it is evident that the Supreme Court of Oregon does 
not directly address the question of whether evidence obtained as a 
result of an illegal search or seizure should be excluded at trial.120 
That case involved the admissibility of a confession obtained “with-
out being first taken before a magistrate.”121 The defendant relied 
upon a non-constitutional exclusionary rule fashioned by the Su-
preme Court in McNabb v. United States122 for violations of a federal 
statute requiring that a person arrested be promptly brought before a 
magistrate. In the Oregon case, the Oregon Supreme Court noted 
that “[w]hen evidence is seized by an illegal search, the illegality is 
the immediate and proximate cause which produces the evidence.”123 
Although this may seem to imply an affirmation of the Weeks doc-
trine, the court proceeded to distinguish illegal search and seizure 
from the facts at hand, which involved a confession. It noted that 
 
 113. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 
383 (1914)). 
 114. Id. at 536. 
 115. See id. at 535. 
 116. See State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 286–87, 293 (Iowa 2000) (the court noted that 
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 117. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 36–37 tbl.I (1949). 
  118. State v. Folkes, 150 P.2d 17 (Or. 1944). 
 119. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 38 tbl.G. 
 120. See Folkes, 150 P.2d 17. 
 121. Id. at 24. 
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“when the illegality, if any, consists merely in questioning the de-
fendant, having failed first to take him before a magistrate, the con-
fession, if voluntarily made, is only remotely, if at all, connected with 
the fact that the officer disobeyed the statute.”124 The Oregon Su-
preme Court, therefore, did not address the admissibility of evidence 
obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure in Folkes. In our 
view, it stands for neither an adoption nor a rejection of the Weeks 
exclusionary rule.125 Therefore, we treat Oregon as not having defin-
itively adopted or rejected the Weeks exclusionary rule before Wolf. 
Because we are interested in determining the pattern of diffusion 
of the exclusionary rule after Weeks, we focused upon whether the 
adoption or rejection of the exclusionary rule by a particular state su-
preme court influenced other state courts. Therefore, we used the 
earliest state supreme court case to adopt a consistent position in a 
particular jurisdiction, while Justice Frankfurter’s tables cited the lat-
est decision. For example, while Justice Frankfurter cited Jackson v. 
State,126 decided in 1923, as rejecting Weeks in Georgia, we chose 
 
 124. Id. 
 125. Recognizing that the status of the exclusionary rule was in a state of flux in Oregon, 
Justice Frankfurter followed the citation to Folkes with a “but see” State v. Laundy, 204 P. 958 
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cited by Frankfurter. That case distinguishes Weeks stating that “the facts in that cause are de-
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arrest elsewhere, whereas Ware involved papers taken from defendant’s place of business at the 
time of his arrest. Id. The Court also noted the general rule that “courts will not pause in the 
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and observed that “[i]f the defendant suffered injury by the seizure of his papers, he had his 
remedy in some civil proceeding.” Id. Because the search and seizure issue was not addressed in 
the original decision, the brevity of this one-page opinion denying the petition for rehearing 
that avoids confronting Weeks cannot be said to confidently place Oregon in either camp re-
garding whether it had adopted the exclusionary rule. 
 126. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 37 tbl.G (citing Jackson v. State, 119 S.E. 525 (Ga. 1923)). 
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Kennemer v. State,127 decided in 1922, which had earlier rejected the 
Weeks doctrine. Similarly, we chose People v. Brocamp128 as adopting 
the exclusionary rule in Illinois in 1923 rather than People v. 
Castree,129 decided in 1924. For the same reasons, we treat Oklahoma 
as having adopted the exclusionary rule in 1921 in Hess v. State,130 ra-
ther than in 1923 in Gore v. State.131 
In some states the treatment of the exclusionary rule raised spe-
cial issues because the court did not maintain a consistent position. 
For instance, according to Justice Frankfurter, the first post-Weeks 
opinion in which the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the Weeks doc-
trine was State v. Myers132 in 1922. But a majority (three of the judges 
on the five justice Supreme Court) actually found no search and sei-
zure violation in that case.133 State v. Anderson,134 moreover, in 1918 
had been the first Idaho case to reject the exclusionary rule after 
Weeks. In 1927, in State v. Arregui135 federal officers obtained evi-
dence using an invalid search warrant and then turned it over to state 
law enforcement officers.136 The Idaho Supreme Court excluded the 
evidence as a matter of state constitutional law.137 We, therefore, 
treat Idaho as having first considered the question of whether to fol-
low the exclusionary rule after Weeks in 1918 and as having adopted 
the exclusionary rule in 1927. 
2. Patterns in the state exclusionary-rule cases 
There are some interesting patterns in the state exclusionary rule 
cases. The time period covered by our study encompassed much of 
the prohibition era (1920–1933), in which there was an effort to min-
imize alcohol in society.138 While possession was not outlawed, alco-
 
 127. Kennemer v. State, 113 S.E. 551 (Ga. 1922). 
 128. People v. Brocamp, 138 N.E. 728 (Ill. 1923). 
 129. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 36 tbl.F (citing People v. Castree, 143 N.E. 112 (Ill. 1924)). 
 130. See Hess v. State, 202 P. 310 (Okla. 1921). 
 131. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 36 tbl.F (citing Gore v. State, 218 P. 545 (Okla. 1923)). 
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 133. See Myers, 211 P. at 445 (Macarthey, J., concurring); see also State v. Arregui, 254 P. 
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 134. See State v. Anderson, 174 P. 124, 125–26 (Idaho 1918). 
 135. See Arregui, 254 P. 788. 
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hol was treated like contraband in the effort to stamp out the large, 
illegal industry devoted to its manufacture, distribution, and sale.139 
Some of the exclusionary rule cases arose from car stops in which the 
authorities conducted warrantless searches and found alcohol that 
was being transported for sale.140 The cases more commonly, howev-
er, arose from searches of private premises that were being used to 
sell alcohol, or private residences that were being used to manufac-
ture alcohol.141 While some cases targeted isolated whiskey stills, un-
doubtedly many defendants were targeted because of their involve-
ment in the organized crime syndicates that often distributed the 
alcohol and engaged in violence and related crimes to protect their 
markets.142 
Fourteen of the sixteen cases in which the exclusionary rule was 
adopted involved charges related to intoxication or the manufacture 
or transportation of the alcohol.143 The two cases that did not involve 
alcohol arose in Wyoming (involving a prosecution for the theft of 
sheep)144 and Illinois (involving a prosecution for burglary).145 The 
proportion of cases involving alcohol in the states that rejected the 
exclusionary rule was much smaller. It appears, therefore, that the 
prevalence of prohibition cases may have been an important factor in 
determining whether the issue of exclusion was raised and reached 
the state supreme courts. In most jurisdictions at this time, defense 
 
Amendment in 1933. U.S. Const. amends. XVIII and XXI. 
 139. See David E. Kyvig, Repealing National Prohibition 26–27 (2d ed. 2000) (de-
scribing the “bootlegging” industry). 
 140. See State v. Pluth, 195 N.W. 789 (Minn. 1923); State v. Simmons, 110 S.E. 591 
(N.C. 1922); Welchek v. State, 247 S.W. 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922). 
 141. See State v. Johnson, 226 P. 245 (Kan. 1924) (charging for possession of a still); 
Billings v. State, 191 N.W. 721 (Neb. 1923) (charging for possession of a still); State v. Dillon, 
281 P. 474 (N.M. 1929) (charging for the possession of alcohol for sale). 
 142. As Kyvig explains, concerns about the violence and related illegal activities spawned 
by the bootlegging industry helped to motivate the movement to repeal prohibition. Kyvig, 
supra note 139, at 74–75. 
 143. See Atz v. Andrews, 94 So. 329 (Fla. 1922); State v. Arregui, 254 P. 788 (Idaho 1927); 
People v. Brocamp, 138 N.E. 728 (Ill. 1923); Flum v. State, 141 N.E. 353 (Ind. 1923); Youman 
v. Commonwealth, 224 S.W. 860 (Ky. 1920); People v. Marxhausen, 171 N.W. 557 (Mich. 
1919); Tucker v. State, 90 So. 845 (Miss. 1922); State v. Owens, 259 S.W. 100 (Mo. 1924); 
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counsel was not provided for the indigent accused in ordinary felony 
cases.146 Interestingly, the prohibition defendants, however, either 
individually or through their employers, apparently had the means to 
afford counsel. Whether a court’s adoption of the exclusionary rule 
was influenced by judicial views about prohibition, which reflected 
local cultural values, would be an interesting topic for further re-
search. Seven of the states that adopted the rule were from what 
many would consider to be the “South.”147 Another five of the states 
that adopted the rule were from what many would consider to be dis-
tinctively “Western” states.148 One of the states that adopted the 
rule, Oklahoma, might be considered both “Southern” and “West-
ern.” Whether the prevalence of “Southern” and “Western” states in 
the adoption of the exclusionary rule was due to happenstance or cul-
tural factors is beyond the scope of this study. 
III. Social-Network Theory 
This study attempts to assess why the exclusionary rule was 
adopted by some states as a matter of state constitutional law before 
the Fourth Amendment being made applicable to the states. It is in 
essence a study of the diffusion of a new state constitutional rule. In 
an early study of this type, Jack Walker treated the diffusion of new 
laws as a sociological phenomenon and drew on insights from the so-
ciological literature on the diffusion of innovations to frame the re-
search question.149 Many of the subsequent studies have also adopted 
this approach.150 There is a sense in which new legislation and new 
 
 146. This did not occur until the Supreme Court mandated the provision of counsel for 
all felony defendants in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 147. These states are Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, Tennessee, 
and West Virginia. See Atz v. Andrews, 94 So. 329 (Fla. 1922); Youman v. Commonwealth, 224 
S.W. 860 (Ky. 1920); Tucker v. State, 90 So. 845 (Miss. 1922); State v. Owens, 259 S.W. 100 
(Mo. 1924); Hess v. State, 202 P. 310 (Okla. 1921); Hughes v. State, 238 S.W. 588 (Tenn. 
1922); State v. Andrews, 114 S.E. 257 (W. Va. 1922). 
 148. These included Idaho, Montana, Oklahoma, Washington, and Wyoming. See State 
v. Arregui, 254 P. 788 (Idaho 1927); State ex rel. King v. Dist. Ct., 224 P. 862 (Mont. 1924); 
Hess v. State, 202 P. 310, (Okla. 1921); State v. Gibbons, 203 P. 390 (Wash. 1922); State v. 
George, 231 P. 638 (Wyo. 1924). In this regard, it is worth noting that Texas also adopted the 
exclusionary rule by statute. 
 149. See Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of Innovations Among the States, 63 Am. Pol. Sci. 
Rev. 880 (1969). See generally Everett M. Rogers, The Diffusion of Innovations (5th ed. 
2003) (providing an overview of the literature on the diffusion of innovations). 
 150. See Frederick J. Boehmke & Richard Witmer, Disentangling Diffusion: The Effects of 
Social Learning and Economic Competition on State Policy Innovation and Expansion, 57 Pol. Res. Q. 
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legal precedents are merely innovations, and legislatures’ or courts’ 
decisions to adopt them bear an analogy to the decisions that other 
actors make about whether to adopt new production techniques, pro-
fessional practices, or modes of behavior. Therefore, this study draws 
on the analogy between legal innovations and other types of innova-
tions to examine the diffusion of the exclusionary rule across the 
states. 
One important respect in which this study differs from most oth-
er studies of the diffusion of new laws, however, is that it frames the 
diffusion process using social-network theory.151 The application of 
social-network theory in empirical legal research is still new, but 
promises many important new perspectives and avenues for re-
search.152 The approach and methods we use in this article were first 
used by Robert Bird and Donald Smythe in a study of the diffusion of 
wrongful-discharge laws across the states during the 1970s and 
1980s.153 The basic idea is to investigate how the “social” structure of 
legal institutions influences the decisions of the state courts. The ap-
proach attempts to draw inferences about the patterns of communica-
tion and persuasion between state court actors by examining how the 
decisions of courts in one state appear to affect the decisions of courts 
in other states.154 
The social-network methods that we use are an alternative to the 
more traditional approach to inferring patterns of communication 
and persuasion among judicial actors by examining the pattern of ci-
tations in courts’ opinions. Scholars have raised questions about the 
 
39 (2004); Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State Supreme 
Courts, 79 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 178 (1985); Bradley C. Canon & Lawrence Baum, Patterns of 
Adopting of Tort Law Innovations: An Application of Diffusion Theory to Judicial Doctrines, 75 Am. 
Pol. Sci. Rev. 975 (1981); Christopher Z. Mooney, Modeling Regional Effects on State Policy Dif-
fusion, 54 Pol. Res. Q. 103 (2001). 
 151. See generally Linton C. Freeman, The Development of Social Network Anal-
ysis: A Study in the Sociology of Science (2004) (providing a history of the subject); John 
Scott, Social Network Analysis: A Handbook (2nd ed. 2000) (providing an excellent in-
troduction to social-network theory and methods). 
 152. Another emerging use of social-network theory in the law is in the study of citation 
patterns. See, e.g., Lillian V. Faulhaber & Daniel Katz, Harvard Law School, A Social Network 
Analysis of American Tax Jurisprudence (1990–2008) (June 12, 2009). See also Daniel Katz & 
Derek Stafford, Hustle and Flow: A Social Network Analysis of the American Federal Judiciary, 71 
Ohio St. L.J. 457 (2010) (a recent article that uses social-network methods to trace connec-
tions between federal judges). 
 153. See Bird & Smythe, supra note 24. 
 154. See id. 
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reliability of citation data in drawing inferences about patterns of in-
fluence and persuasion across courts.155 Court opinions often seem to 
“string out” case names, and it is not always apparent that the opin-
ions cited were truly influential or whether they were merely being 
used to legitimize the courts’ decisions.156 Indeed, there is little em-
pirical basis for evaluating whether the citations truly reflect influ-
ences across courts or whether they merely reflect the courts’ efforts 
to legitimize their decisions. In one study, however, David Walsh 
found significant evidence that courts often use citations for legitimi-
zation purposes.157 His study corroborates some of the concerns that 
scholars have raised about citation data. We feel that the concerns are 
significant enough to warrant experimentation with other methods of 
drawing inferences about patterns of influence and persuasion across 
courts, including the social-network methods that we use in this arti-
cle. 
Under our approach, we conceive of the American legal system as 
a social network, and the state supreme courts as actors within the 
network whose decisions depend in part upon the decisions of other 
courts, especially those that are closely related to them.158 In general, 
the degree of influence between any two actors in a social network—
in this case, state courts—depends upon their “closeness” or “con-
nectedness” within the network.159 Drawing on the network analogy, 
we assume that the decisions of a court in any one state depend, to 
 
 155. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and 
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 156. Id. at 804. 
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 159. Cf. Mark. E. MacDonald, Jr. & Camille R. McLeod, Pictures Are Worth a Thousand 
Words: Understanding the Chapter 11 Process Through Models and Simulation, 526 PLI/Comm 453, 
486–87 (1990) (describing in context of neural networks). 
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some extent, on the relative influence or persuasiveness of precedents 
by courts in other states. The relative influence of precedents estab-
lished by other courts depends on the relationship between the two 
courts in the social network.160 The method is one that examines the 
decisions taken by the courts to draw inferences about the patterns of 
influence and persuasion between them. Whereas citation studies 
draw inferences about patterns of influence based on what courts 
have said was influential, the social-network approach that we use 
draws inferences about patterns of influence based on what courts ac-
tually did. 
One of the difficulties in using social-network theory to study the 
diffusion of legal precedents is in identifying the factors that might 
determine the “closeness” or “connectedness” of courts within the le-
gal network. It is helpful, therefore, to frame the issue somewhat dif-
ferently. One can conceive of the actors in a social network as be-
longing to certain “reference groups”—that is, subgroups of actors 
that relate more closely to one another than they do to other actors 
outside the subgroup. The idea is very intuitive and examples are 
quite common. In a network of high school students, for example, the 
reference groups might include “jocks,” “brains,” “partiers,” and 
“nerds.”161 The usual hypothesis is that decisions by other actors that 
belong to the same reference group will be more influential than de-
cisions by other actors that do not belong to the same reference 
group. Among a network of high school students, for example, the 
jocks will be more influential on other jocks than on brains, partiers, 
or nerds.162 The brains will be more influential on other brains than 
on jocks, partiers or nerds. In other words, actors within the same 
reference group are closer or more connected to one another than 
they are to other actors outside of the reference group, and their de-
cisions will be more influential on one another than on other actors 
outside the reference group. 
In this study, we conceive of the social network as being com-
prised of state courts. Studies of legal citations in courts’ opinions 
suggest that the persuasiveness of a court’s precedent on other courts 
may depend on criteria such as membership of the courts in the same 
 
 160. Bird & Smythe, supra note 24, at 838–39. 
 161. See, e.g., Barbara M. Newman & Philip R. Newman, Development Through 
Life: A Psychological Approach 339 (10th ed. 2008) (including a discussion of social-
reference groups among a group of high school students). 
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legal reporting district, their geographical proximity, and sharing a 
regional culture.163 Other studies suggest that the federal circuit re-
gions are an important reference group for federal judges, and that 
federal judges frequently attend the meetings of the state bar associa-
tions within their circuit districts.164 This suggests that the “federal 
circuit regions may also define an important reference group for at-
torneys and state judges.”165 This study identified four reference 
groups, and tested and compared the influence of precedents by other 
courts within these groups in the diffusion of the exclusionary rule. 
The four reference groups were (1) neighboring states, (2) states 
within the same federal circuit region, (3) states within the same 
West reporting region, and (4) states within the same census region. 
The first objective was to determine whether precedents within any 
of these reference groups were at all persuasive on their own, and the 
second objective was to distinguish whether precedents in any one of 
the reference groups were generally more influential than precedents 
in the others.166 
Of course, the American legal system is somewhat more compli-
cated than the discussion above suggests, and so precedents operate 
on different actors at different stages of the legal process.167 Cases 
must first “bubble up” to the courts before the courts can have the 
opportunity to rule on any new legal questions they raise.168 In the 
context of new precedents affecting private law, for example, the par-
ties are responsible for asserting their own private legal rights. A 
precedent by a court in one state that creates a new private cause of 
action could encourage similarly aggrieved parties in another juris-
diction to go to a lawyer to seek this same type of legal redress.169 
The new precedent might encourage the plaintiff’s attorney to accept 
the case and use the out-of state precedent as the basis for arguing for 
 
 163. See Caldeira, supra note 153, at 190; Canon & Baum, supra note 153, at 985. 
 164. See Robert A. Carp, The Scope and Function of Intra-Circuit Judicial Communication: A 
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the new cause of action in the plaintiff’s state.170 At that point, the 
question of whether the new rule should be adopted in the plaintiff’s 
state would come before a court and the court would be required to 
make a decision. Precedents in other states addressing the same issue 
could influence the court’s decision at this level of the legal pro-
cess.171 
The social structure of the legal system could be important at all 
of the foregoing levels of the process. First of all, a potential plaintiff 
with a grievance may be more likely to feel she has grounds for a law-
suit against someone if she hears about a similar, successful case from 
another jurisdiction. She may be more likely to hear about such a 
case if it is from a neighboring state or a state within the same region 
of the country than if it is from some distant and dissimilar state.172 
Second, any attorney to whom she initially takes her grievances may 
be more inclined to take the case in reliance on a precedent if he feels 
it will be a persuasive one that will allow his client’s complaint to sur-
vive summary judgment.173 An attorney might feel that a precedent 
from a court within the same federal circuit region or the same geo-
graphical region will be more persuasive than others. Finally, the 
court that hears the case may actually be more persuaded by some 
precedents than others. Courts may be more strongly influenced by 
precedents within the same federal circuit region or the same geo-
graphical region of the country, or by courts in states that belong to 
some other reference group, whatever that might be.174 
On a question of public law, such as the application of the exclu-
sionary rule to suppress evidence in a criminal case, the process 
would be somewhat different even though different actors would still 
be important at different stages in the process. We can distinguish 
between at least two distinct stages: first, the stage at which the rule is 
invoked; and second, the stage at which it is adjudicated. Criminal 
charges would be made against the defendant by a public official. The 
defendant’s attorney would then attempt to invoke the exclusionary 
rule to suppress the state’s evidence. If there were no binding prece-
dents on the exclusionary rule from that jurisdiction, the attorney’s 
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decision to invoke it would probably be influenced by persuasive au-
thorities from other states, especially precedents from other states’ 
supreme courts in which the rule was adopted. Precedents from other 
states’ supreme courts in which the rule was rejected might disincline 
the attorney to invoke the rule. Once the rule was invoked, the court 
would then have to render a holding on the question of whether it 
should apply. If the question was a matter of first impression, the trial 
court’s holding might well be appealed, and the appeal might reach 
the state supreme court. At this point, the state supreme court could 
issue a binding precedent on the question of whether the exclusionary 
rule should apply. 
Social-network effects could be important at both stages in the 
diffusion of a new public law holding, such as the adoption of the ex-
clusionary rule. At the first stage in the process, the defense attor-
ney’s decision to invoke the rule would probably depend heavily on 
her awareness of any precedents from other states in which it had 
been adopted and her assessment of whether those precedents would 
be persuasive to her own states’ courts. She might be more aware of 
precedents from neighboring states, for instance, than from those in 
the same census region of the country. She might also feel that prec-
edents from neighboring states would be more persuasive than those 
from other state courts in the same census region. In that case, 
neighboring states would constitute an important reference group in 
her decision to invoke the exclusionary rule and raise the question of 
whether to adopt it to her own states’ courts. At the second stage in 
the process, the courts’ decisions about whether to adopt the exclu-
sionary rule would probably depend in some part on the persuasive-
ness of precedents adopting or rejecting the rule from other states’ 
courts. Precedents from courts in neighboring states might be more 
persuasive than precedents from other courts in the same census re-
gion, or vice versa. It is primarily at this last stage in the diffusion 
process that patterns of influence and persuasion between state courts 
would be most evident. 
But the entire diffusion process is important. Indeed, one of the 
limitations of the previous studies that used social-network methods 
to investigate the diffusion of new state laws is that they have focused 
entirely on the last stage of the diffusion process.175 They have been 
unable to evaluate why cases of first impression may have “bubbled 
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up” to the state supreme court in the first place or even conjecture as 
to the factors that influenced the likelihood of that happening. Be-
cause the data available for this study is somewhat richer than that 
which was available in the previous studies, we are able to draw infer-
ences here about the patterns of influence and other underlying forc-
es that resulted in cases raising the question as to whether the exclu-
sionary rule should be adopted reaching the state supreme courts in 
the first place, and then we are able to draw inferences about the pat-
terns of influence and other forces that caused the state supreme 
courts to choose to adopt the exclusionary rule in those cases that did 
reach them. In this respect, the present study delves deeper into the 
web of connections between state court systems than earlier studies. 
IV. The Data 
Most of the data in this study is constructed from judicial deci-
sions. We coded every state supreme court’s decision about whether 
to adopt or reject the exclusionary rule as a matter of state constitu-
tional law between 1915 and 1936.176 A binary variable was used first 
to record whether the state supreme court had addressed the question 
at all by each year in the sample period. Second, an additional binary 
variable was used to record whether the state supreme court adopted 
the rule. We then constructed several variables from the data to indi-
cate the number of prior adoptions and rejections of the rule by 
courts in each state’s reference groups—we refer to these as “net-
work” variables. Network variables were constructed to isolate and 
compare the effects of precedents by courts in: (1) neighboring states, 
(2) the same federal circuit region, (3) the same West reporting re-
gion,177 and (4) the same census region.178 The network variables 
were defined as the proportion of states within the reference group 
that had previously adopted the exclusionary rule minus the propor-
 
 176. In a few states, the rule was adopted or rejected by a lower court and never addressed 
by the state’s supreme court. In those cases, we treated the highest court’s decision on the ques-
tion as the authority for the state’s law. 
 177. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
 178. The census regions were chosen to determine whether regional cultural similarities 
may have factored in the relative influence of legal precedents. To that end, two of the states, 
Delaware and Maryland, were reclassified as “Middle Atlantic” states instead of “South Atlan-
tic” states. The former grouping includes New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. The latter 
includes primarily southern coastal states, such as Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina. We 
believe that Delaware and Maryland have more cultural similarities with the Mid-Atlantic states 
than with the southern states. 
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tion of states within the reference group that had previously rejected 
the exclusionary rule.179 The idea was to quantify the net effect of the 
precedents—that is, the positive influence of adoptions net of the 
negative influence of the rejections. The variables were defined pro-
portionally to the total number of states in the reference groups in 
part to adjust for the unequal sizes of the groups. It is worth empha-
sizing that although two of these network variables (the ones defined 
for the census regions and neighboring states) are primarily geo-
graphic in nature, the other two (the ones defined for the federal cir-
cuit and West reporting regions) primarily reflect the structure of 
American legal institutions. 
The method resulted in the following network variables: neigh-
boring state network variables, which equal the net proportion of 
neighboring (contiguous) states that had previously adopted the ex-
clusionary rule; federal circuit region network variables, which equal 
the net proportion of states within the same federal circuit region 
that had previously adopted the rule; West reporting region network 
variables, which equal the net proportion of states within the same 
West reporting region that had previously adopted the rule; and cen-
sus region network variables, which equal the net proportion of states 
within the same census region that had previously adopted the 
rule.180 In their earlier studies, Bird and Smythe defined the network 
variables as the proportion of adoptions rather than the proportion of 
net adoptions.181 We are able to define the network variables in this 
study as the net proportion of adoptions because we have a richer da-
ta set that includes the rejections of the exclusionary rule as well as 
the adoptions. This should make the empirical analysis more reliable. 
Since the network variables are the primary focus of our study, 
some descriptive statistics about them may be helpful. We ran two 
sets of logistic regressions182: one to investigate the forces causing the 
question about whether to adopt the exclusionary rule to arise, and 
 
 179. The network variables were defined to include only previous adoptions net of previ-
ous rejections within the reference groups to preclude endogeneity problems. They were also 
defined cumulatively, i.e., as the total number of previous adoptions net of the total number of 
previous rejections in the reference groups for each year. 
 180. U.S. Census Bureau, Census Regions and Divisions of the United States, Census.gov, 
http://www.census.gov/geo/www/us_regdiv.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2012) (U.S. Census Bureau 
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 181. Bird & Smythe, supra note 24, at 847. 
 182. A logistic regression is commonly used when the dependent variable is binary. Intui-
tively, it involves estimating the probability that a particular outcome will occur. 
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the other to investigate the forces causing the state supreme courts to 
adopt the rule. Because of the method, the sample was different for 
each of the two sets of regressions. Thus, the summary statistics of 
the network variables were slightly different for each of the two sets 
of regressions. Table 1 presents some summary statistics for the net-
work variables in the first set of regressions. There are 477 observa-
tions in the sample. The mean of each of the network variables is 
negative but greater than -0.1. This means that on average, across all 
states and years in the sample, slightly more states in each reference 
group had rejected the exclusionary rule than had adopted it. The 
range of values for the neighborhood network variable is from -1 to 
0.8. In other words, for at least one state in one year, all of the neigh-
boring states had rejected the rule (thus the net proportion of adop-
tions in neighboring states was -1). In at least one other state in one 
year, the net proportion of adoptions in neighboring states was 0.8 
(in net, 80% of the neighbors had adopted). Except for the West re-
porting region network variable, the ranges of values for each of the 
other network variables in the sample are roughly the same. The 
West network variable is somewhat smaller on the maximum end of 
the range. 
Table 2 presents some summary statistics for the network varia-
bles in the second set of regressions. There are 848 observations in 
the sample—significantly more than in the sample used for the first 
set of regressions. The mean of each of the network variables is nega-
tive, indicating that on average, there were more rejections among 
the reference groups than adoptions. The mean of the net proportion 
of adoptions for each network variable is actually smaller than in the 
sample for the first set of regressions (a bigger negative number). The 
value ranges of the network variables are similar to the value ranges 
of the network variables in the sample for the first set of regressions. 
In this case, however, the West reporting region network variable is 
slightly less stunted at the maximum end relative to the others. 
We added additional variables to our regressions as controls. 
State population was added to control for scale effects. It seems more 
likely that search and seizure questions would arise in states with 
large populations than in states with small populations simply be-
cause there should have been more searches and seizures in the large 
states. Based on our analysis of the cases, it seems quite possible that 
prohibition may have played a role in the diffusion of the exclusion-
ary rule. Many of the early search and seizure cases raising questions 
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about whether the exclusionary rule should apply appear to have in-
volved illegal searches for alcohol, stills, or other related contra-
band.183 Prohibition may have increased the likelihood that questions 
about the exclusionary rule would arise in the courts, and it may even 
have influenced the courts’ answers to those questions. To control 
for this possibility, two additional binary variables were constructed, 
one to indicate whether federal prohibition was in effect, and the 
other to indicate whether state prohibition was in effect.184 Finally, 
state political cultures may have influenced the judicial philosophies 
of state judges and justices or they may have influenced the decisions 
of state judges and justices because of the contexts in which their 
opinions were delivered. We therefore constructed eight binary vari-
ables to control for any state culture effects using Daniel Elazar’s ty-
pology of state political cultures.185 
V. Empirical Method 
We used logistic regressions to evaluate which, if any, of the net-
work variables most strongly influenced the diffusion of the exclu-
sionary rule at each of the two stages in the diffusion process: the first 
stage in which the question arose, and the second stage in which the 
rule was (or was not) adopted.186 We first ran a set of logistic regres-
 
 183. See supra Part II. 
 184. Several states had established state-level prohibitions against alcohol before federal 
prohibition was established. Of course, when federal prohibitions were established they often 
then overlapped with the state prohibitions. This makes it difficult to separate the effects of 
federal prohibition from those of state prohibition in our study; but since these are not our fo-
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any prohibition effects so that we can clearly identify the network effects. The state prohibition 
variable was constructed from information about state prohibitions presented in Angela K. Dills 
& Jeffrey A. Miron, Alcohol Prohibition and Cirrhosis, 6 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 285 (2004). 
 185. Elazar identified three dominant types of political cultures: moralist, individualist, 
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J. Elazar, American Federalism (3rd ed. 1984). 
 186. A binary regression method, such as a logistic regression, is preferable to ordinary 
least squares when the dependent variable is binary, as in this case. See Bird & Smythe, supra 
note 24, at 846. In our study, the first stage dependent variable has the value of zero in any state 
and year for which the question about the exclusionary rule has not arisen, and one in any state 
and year in which it has arisen. The second stage dependent variable has the value zero in any 
state and year for which the exclusionary rule has not been adopted, and one in any state and 
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sions to investigate the forces driving whether a case raising the ques-
tion of whether to adopt the exclusionary rule arose in each state su-
preme court by each year in the sample period.187 We included the 
four network variables, as well as the controls. In addition, we includ-
ed binary variables for each year so that any extraneous influences 
unique to any particular year could be accounted for in the model 
separately.188 We ran a second set of logistic regressions to investi-
gate the forces driving the adoption of the exclusionary rule by the 
state supreme courts.189 We included the four network variables 
again, as well as all of the controls, and we included binary variables 
for each year to control for individual year effects.190 
Our basic strategy was to try to identify robust empirical re-
sults.191 Thus, all control variables were included in all of the regres-
sions even though they probably had overlapping effects.192 Binary 
variables for each year were also included in all of the regressions.193 
Our purpose was to try to control for any extraneous influences on 
the forces driving whether the question about the exclusionary rule 
arose and whether it was adopted, rather than to isolate the influence 
of particular control variables. Finally, in addition to the results re-
ported here, we ran many other regressions to test the robustness of 
the results. We do not present all of the results in this article, but 
 
year in which it has been adopted. 
 187. The sample was modified by dropping all the observation in any state for the years 
after the question arose. The method is thus a form of hazard analysis and the empirical model 
is similar to a Cox proportional hazard model. See id. 
 188. This makes the empirical model very similar to the Cox model, in which the baseline 
hazard rate does not have to be estimated in order to estimate the separate effects of the inde-
pendent variables. Id. 
 189. Once again, the sample was modified—this time by dropping all the observations in 
any state for the years after the exclusionary rule was adopted. Id. 
 190. The second set of logistic regressions was run independently of the first set. In a 
two-stage analysis like this it is often desirable to do a sequential logit analysis in which the two 
sets of regressions are related. It turned out, however, that certain complications in the case law 
precluded sequential logit analysis. 
 191. Empirical results are said to be “robust” when they are the same regardless of minor 
variations in the independent variables that are included or the way the empirical model is spec-
ified. Robust empirical results obviously have more credibility than those that do depend on 
nuances in the empirical model’s specification. 
 192. This was, no doubt, especially the case for the federal and state prohibition variables. 
 193. The binary variables to capture the individual year effects may also have overlapped 
with and confounded the separate effects of the control variables. Again, though, since the pri-
mary purpose of the control variables is to ensure that the estimates of the network variables are 
reliable, this is not a problem. 
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none of the results that we have omitted undermine any of the results 
we present here or any of the conclusions of our study. 
VI. Results 
Table 3 presents results from the first set of regressions in which 
the question of whether to adopt the exclusionary rule arose is the 
dependent variable. Each column presents the results from a different 
regression. The independent variables are listed on the left hand side 
of the table. The coefficients of the independent variables in each of 
the regressions are the un-bracketed numbers entered in the corre-
sponding space in each column. If the number is positive, the variable 
had a positive effect on the likelihood of the question about the ex-
clusionary rule arising and if the number is negative, the variable had 
a negative effect on the likelihood of the question arising. In certain 
regressions, some of the network variables were excluded. In those 
cases, there is no entry for its coefficient in the table. The number in 
brackets beneath the coefficients of the variables is a test statistic 
computed to determine whether the variable is statistically significant 
at different confidence levels.194 
A. Stage-One Diffusion: Whether the Issue of Exclusion Was Raised 
The results in Table 3 are quite striking. A quick scan across all 
eight columns clearly indicates that the network variable defined for 
the West reporter regions dominated all of the other network varia-
bles at this first stage in the diffusion process. As column 1 indicates, 
when all four network variables were included in the regressions 
(along with all the controls and the binary variables for the years), the 
West reporter network variable was the only one that was both posi-
tive and close to being statistically significant at the 90% level of con-
fidence. As columns 2–4 indicate, when the West reporter network 
variable was included along with each of the other network variables 
individually, it dominated in each case, in the sense that its coefficient 
was both positive and more statistically significant (at the 95% level 
of confidence in one case and the 90% level of confidence in another 
case). As columns 5–8 indicate, when each network variable was in-
cluded alone, the only one whose coefficient was close to being both 
positive and statistically significant was the West reporter network 
 
 194. This is the logistic regression equivalent of a t-statistic in an ordinary least squares 
regression. 
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variable, which was positive and statistically significant at the 90% 
level of confidence. 
The dominance of the West reporter network variable at the first 
stage in the diffusion process is a new result, since none of the previ-
ous studies of this type have examined the forces that caused a legal 
question to arise in the first place. The result suggests that the West 
reporters may have served as an important source of information 
about the existence of new precedents from other states in which the 
exclusionary rule was adopted. Attorneys at the time may have been 
more likely to keep abreast of new case law that was reported in the 
regional reporter that included their own state than of other case law 
generally. Attorneys might have also felt that new precedents report-
ed in their own state’s West reporter would be more persuasive on 
the courts in their own state. Since the sample period was one that 
long pre-dated the emergence of electronic databanks of case prece-
dents, and new precedents were probably harder to find than they are 
today, the dominance of the West reporters in driving the question 
about the exclusionary rule to the courts is intuitively compelling. 
The other results in Table 3 are not our primary focus, but they 
are at least worth noting. Both of the prohibition variables have nega-
tive coefficients in all the regressions. This suggests that both federal 
and state prohibition laws diminished the likelihood that the question 
about the exclusionary rule would arise. That seems counterintuitive. 
But neither of the two prohibition variables is statistically significant 
in all of the regressions. Indeed, the federal prohibition variable is 
not statistically significant at any respectable level of confidence in 
any of the regressions, although the state prohibition variable is sta-
tistically significant at the 90% level of confidence in some of the re-
gressions, and it is statistically significant at the 95% level of confi-
dence in one of them. Since the prohibition variables are only being 
used as controls and the model includes binary variables for each 
year, the empirical model is not intended to evaluate the impact of 
prohibition laws on the diffusion of the exclusionary rule and these 
results are not particularly reliable. It is also interesting to note that 
neither the state population variable, nor all of the Elazer political 
culture variables, was statistically significant in any of the regres-
sions.195 
 
 195. In some cases, Table 3 does not report the estimates for certain of the Elazar varia-
bles’ test statistics. The logistic regressions were computed using Stata. Stata employs an itera-
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B. Stage-Two Diffusion: Whether Exclusionary Rule Was Adopted 
Table 4 presents results from the second set of regressions in 
which the decision to adopt the exclusionary rule was the dependent 
variable. Table 2 is organized exactly like Table 1, with the results for 
each regression reported in a separate column, the independent vari-
ables listed on the left hand side, and the coefficients of the inde-
pendent variables in each regression reported above the bracketed 
test statistics in the appropriate column. The results are equally strik-
ing, if not more so, because even a cursory perusal reveals that an en-
tirely different, but equally dominant, pattern is evident in the diffu-
sion of the courts’ decisions to adopt the exclusionary rule than in the 
diffusion of the question about the rule being brought up in the 
courts. 
As column 1 indicates, when all four network variables are in-
cluded in the regressions, the one defined for the federal circuit re-
gions clearly dominates. It is the only one whose coefficient is both 
positive and statistically significant at the 90% level of confidence. As 
columns 2–4 indicate, when the federal circuit network variable is in-
cluded against each of the other network variables individually, the 
federal circuit network variable again dominates, in the sense that it is 
the only one whose coefficient is both positive and statistically signif-
icant at the 90% or 95% level of confidence. Finally, as columns 5–8 
indicate, when each of the network variables is included in the regres-
sions alone, the federal circuit region network variable is the only one 
whose coefficient is both positive and statistically significant at the 
95% level of confidence. At the second stage in the diffusion process, 
the stage at which courts actually decide whether to adopt the exclu-
sionary rule, the federal circuit network variable clearly dominates 
the other network variables in much the same manner that the West 
reporter network variable dominates the others at the first stage in 
the diffusion process. 
The results in Table 4 are striking in part because they corrobo-
rate the results of Bird and Smythe’s previous studies, but in a new 
sample showing the diffusion of a new public law rather than a new 
private law, and over a much earlier period in United States history. 
The results are also striking for the same reasons that they were in 
 
tive method for computing binary regression models and in some of the regressions the method 
was unable to estimate the standard errors of the Elazar variables. Since the Elazar variables 
were included in the model primarily as controls we do not consider this particularly important. 
 BYU Journal of Public Law   [Vol. 27 
136 
Bird and Smythe’s earlier studies. These results suggest an unex-
pected pattern of communication and influence across the state 
courts’ decisions. It is important to emphasize that this study is exam-
ining the diffusion of the exclusionary rule as a matter of state consti-
tutional law before the rule was applied to the states as a matter of 
federal constitutional law. It is not at all obvious that the federal cir-
cuit regions, as determined by the administrative structure of the fed-
eral courts, should have defined an important reference group for the 
state courts on a question of state constitutional law. The fact that 
they appear to do so, both in this study and in Bird and Smythe’s ear-
lier studies, suggests that the administrative structure of the federal 
courts may have made an important imprint on the pattern of com-
munications and influence across the state courts. Since the exclu-
sionary rule diffused across the states much earlier than wrongful-
discharge laws or the strict liability rule, the imprint may have been 
made much earlier than one might have guessed from the previous 
studies alone. 
Robert Bird and Donald Smythe have already made several con-
jectures as to why the federal circuit regions seem to influence the 
diffusion of state laws. As they note, it seems reasonable to surmise 
that the federal circuit regions’ influence derives either from some 
form of intra-circuit communication or information flow among state 
judges within the circuits or from more direct influences on the de-
velopment of state law.196 One possibility, of course, is that state 
courts may follow legal developments in other state courts within the 
same federal circuit region more closely than they follow legal devel-
opments in state courts outside the same circuit region.197 This may 
be a habit that attorneys and state judges develop from having to fol-
low federal precedents within their circuit regions on federal legal 
questions. The practice of looking for precedents on federal legal 
questions within the same federal circuit regions may inculcate the 
habit of looking for precedents on state legal questions from other 
state courts within the same federal circuit regions.198 
Although we are not aware of any studies of intra-circuit commu-
nications among state judges, there is some evidence of important in-
tra-circuit communications among federal judges. Indeed, Robert 
 
 196. See Bird & Smythe, supra note 24, at 857. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
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Carp has found that federal judges communicate with other federal 
judges within the same circuit in a variety of ways, including through 
judicial conferences, professional contacts, personal contacts, and 
correspondence.199 In his study, he found that federal judges com-
municated frequently with other federal judges in non-contiguous 
states within the same federal circuit but rarely, if ever, with other 
federal judges in contiguous states that were not within the same fed-
eral circuit.200 Carp also noted the important role played by state bar 
association meetings and professional journals in these intra-circuit 
communications.201 Since state judges no doubt also interact with 
federal judges at state bar association meetings, and probably also 
read many of the same professional journals, state bar association 
meetings and professional journals may also facilitate intra-circuit 
communications among state courts. 
The results from the study we present in this article raise serious 
doubts about some of Bird and Smythe’s other conjectures. For in-
stance, they noted that the State-Federal Judicial Councils may have 
helped to facilitate communications among state judges as well as be-
tween state and federal judges within particular federal circuits.202 
But since these were established only in the early 1970s, they cannot 
help to explain the pattern of communication and influence that we 
observe here in the diffusion of the exclusionary rule between 1915 
and 1936. Bird and Smythe have also conjectured that the federal cir-
cuit regions may provide an “echo” effect for some state court opin-
ions.203 Since federal courts often cite state court opinions, attorneys 
and judges in other states who follow the federal cases in their own 
circuits may be more inclined to see and read those opinions than 
opinions from other state courts outside the same circuit region. It 
seems unlikely, however, that there was any significant echo effect in 
the diffusion of the exclusionary rule across the states, since questions 
from state criminal prosecutions rarely reach the federal courts unless 
they raise federal constitutional issues. Further studies will, therefore, 
be helpful in clarifying why the federal circuit regions seem to define 
important channels of communication and influence in the diffusion 
of state laws. 
 
 199. Carp, supra note 164, at 409. 
 200. Id. at 414, 416. 
 201. Id. at 412, 415. 
 202. Bird & Smythe, supra note 24, at 858. 
 203. Bird & Smythe, supra note 25, at 582–83. 
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It is interesting to note that the coefficient of the West reporter 
network variable is actually negative in all of the regressions, includ-
ing the one reported in column 7 in Table 4, in which it was the only 
network variable included in the model. If the West reporter regions 
defined an important reference group in the question about the ex-
clusionary rule arising in the first place, they certainly do not appear 
to have defined an important reference group in the courts’ decisions 
to adopt the rule. It is also worth noting that neither the federal nor 
state prohibition binary variables are statistically significant in any of 
the regressions. Once again, it is well to remember that these varia-
bles are only controls and their influence may be confounded by their 
correlations with other control variables. Although the prohibition 
era may have resulted in many cases in which the exclusionary rule 
was invoked, it does not appear to have influenced the state courts’ 
holdings. Finally, it is also worth noting that the state population var-
iable was again not statistically significant in any of the regressions, 
nor were all of the Elazar political culture variables consistently sig-
nificant across the regressions (indeed, in some cases the standard er-
rors of the coefficients of the Elazar variables could not be comput-
ed). 
VII. Conclusion 
The law is constantly changing and evolving. Attorneys must 
therefore be able to make judgments about whether the courts are 
likely to overrule their own precedents when they prepare cases and 
advise clients. Empirical studies offer one way of improving our abil-
ity to identify and track important trends in the law and make better 
judgments about whether and how the law may change. This article 
reports the results of an empirical study that has used social-network 
methods to draw inferences about the underlying patterns of com-
munication and influence across state courts. One important ad-
vantage of this approach is that it draws inferences from the courts’ 
decisions, which reflect what they actually did, rather than their cita-
tions, which reflect only what they said was important. We believe 
that the social-network methods we describe in this article are a use-
ful alternative to the citation methods that have typically been used in 
empirical legal research. 
We used social-network methods in this study to examine the dif-
fusion of the exclusionary rule as a matter of state constitutional law 
before the Fourth Amendment was applied to the states. Our results 
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both corroborate and extend those of previous studies. Indeed, they 
suggest that the diffusion of the exclusionary rule was more compli-
cated than previous studies of the diffusion of new state laws might 
have suggested. The previous studies by Bird and Smythe focused en-
tirely on the adoption of new legal rules by the state courts and were 
unable to examine the forces that caused the questions to arise in the 
first place. Our results in this study suggest that at the first stage in 
the diffusion process, the stage in which the question of whether to 
adopt the exclusionary rule “bubbled up” to the state supreme courts, 
the West legal reporter regions defined an important network of 
communication and influence between the state courts. 
This actually makes a good deal of sense. At this stage in the dif-
fusion process, the question about the exclusionary rule was probably 
driven by criminal defendants and their attorneys who wanted to 
challenge convictions based on evidence seized without warrants or 
the requisite exigent circumstances. The criminal defense attorneys 
who represented the defendants no doubt looked for case precedents 
upon which to base their efforts to suppress the evidence. The exclu-
sionary rule diffused as a matter of state constitutional law in the ear-
ly twentieth century after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in 
Weeks in 1914. This was long before the advent of electronic data-
bases. In the early twentieth century, legal research was typically 
done using legal reporters, and the West legal reporters may have 
grouped the case precedents in a way that influenced whether a chal-
lenge was made. An attorney was probably more likely to see a case 
adopting the exclusionary rule in another state if it was published in 
the same West legal reporter that published the cases from his own 
state. The West legal reporters did not, however, appear to define an 
important reference group at the second stage in the diffusion pro-
cess, the stage at which state supreme courts actually decided whether 
to adopt the exclusionary rule. Thus, the fact that a case was from 
another state supreme court whose opinions were published in the 
same West legal reporter does not appear to have made it any more 
persuasive. 
Indeed, it appears that the federal circuit regions defined an im-
portant reference group at the second stage in the diffusion of the ex-
clusionary rule. In other words, a state supreme-court decision from 
another jurisdiction that adopted the rule appeared to be more per-
suasive if that state was within the same federal circuit as the state 
considering such adoption. Because the issue involved state law, this 
is a striking result that we would not have expected if other studies 
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had not already found that the federal circuit regions appear to define 
important channels of communication and influence between states 
courts. It is interesting, however, that Robert Bird and Donald 
Smythe have also found that the federal circuit regions defined im-
portant reference groups in the diffusion of new state laws in two 
separate studies: one on wrongful-discharge laws and the other on 
the strict liability rule in tort for manufacturing defects. The federal 
circuit regions thus appear to have left an important imprint on the 
pattern of communications and influence across state courts. At this 
point, we can only conjecture as to why decisions by other state 
courts within the same federal circuit regions appear to be more per-
suasive than decisions by courts in neighboring states, the same West 
reporter regions, or the same census regions, but it is a result that 
now has significant corroboration across three separate studies. 
Further studies of the diffusion of new state laws are clearly war-
ranted. In light of the Supreme Court’s recent narrowing of the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, for example, state search and 
seizure exclusionary rules for violations of state constitutional provi-
sions have taken on new importance. In Herring v United States,204 for 
example, the Court held that evidence obtained incident to an arrest 
on a recalled arrest warrant should not be excluded because the fail-
ure of the police department to remove the recalled warrant from its 
database was an act of “isolated negligence” and the reliance upon the 
warrant by a police officer from a different police agency was not the 
result of deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct.205 This 
decision appears to significantly expand the so called “good faith” ex-
ception to the exclusionary rule created in United States v. Leon,206 by 
requiring police culpability for an illegal search or seizure to equate 
to recklessness. Whether state supreme courts will follow suit and 
adopt this new standard for their state law exclusionary rule raises an 
interesting question, especially in view of the fact that some states re-
jected the Leon good faith exception altogether when redressing vio-
lations of their state constitution.207 
Further studies directed at more clearly understanding the con-
nections and influences between state and federal courts more gener-
 
 207. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
 205. Id. at 137, 144. 
 206. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 207. See, e.g., State v. Marsala, 479 A.2d 58, 68 (Conn. 1990). 
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ally might be especially insightful.208 Studies that attempt to corrobo-
rate the role of the West legal reporters in the first stage of the diffu-
sion process would also be interesting, especially in view of the en-
hanced research capabilities that have been created by electronic 
databases which did not exist in the early 1900s. Ultimately, we hope 
that, in addition to their historical value, studies of this kind will shed 
enough light on the patterns of communication and influence be-
tween courts that attorneys may be able to better predict imminent 
changes in the law and legal reformers may be able to more effective-
ly influence developments in the law. 
 
  
 
 208. Whether an early decision by state supreme courts within a federal court of appeals 
circuit will exert influence upon other state supreme courts within that circuit region, for exam-
ple, would be interesting to examine. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics: Network Variables in the 
First-Stage Regressions 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Neighboring-state 
network variable 
477 -0.07 0.29 -1.00 0.80 
Federal-circuit  
network variable 
477 -0.07 0.26 -0.75 0.75 
West-reporter  
network variable 
477 -0.09 0.19 -0.89 0.20 
Census-region  
network variable 
477 -0.07 0.26 -0.83 0.80 
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics: Network Variables in the 
Second-Stage Regressions 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Neighboring-state net-
work variable 
848 -0.20 0.40 -1.00 0.80 
Federal-circuit  
network variable 
848 -0.16 0.27 -0.75 0.75 
West-reporter  
network variable 
848 -0.13 0.28 -0.89 0.40 
Census-region  
network variable 
848 -0.16 0.31 -0.83 0.80 
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Table 3: Logistic Regressions: Dependent Variable as 
the Question Whether to Adopt the Exclusionary Rule 
Number of Observations: 477 | Equations 1–8 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
Neighbor-state 
network variable 
-1.10 
(-1.26) 
-0.82 
(-1.11)   
-0.20 
(-0.27)    
Federal-circuit 
network variable 
1.23 
(1.08)  
0.37 
(0.43)   
0.98 
(1.32)   
West-reporter net-
work variable 
2.70 
(1.69) 
2.99 
(2.16)* 
2.15 
(1.47) 
2.77 
(1.76)**   
2.44 
(1.89)**  
Census-region 
network variable 
-0.55 
(-0.40)   
-0.38 
(-0.37)    
0.68 
(0.84) 
Population 
 
-0.00 
(-0.41) 
-0.00 
(-0.53) 
-0.00 
(-0.84) 
-0.00 
(-0.77) 
0.00 
(0.45) 
-0.00 
(-0.12) 
-0.00 
(-0.83) 
-0.00 
(-.07) 
State prohibition 
 
-1.13 
(-1.90) 
-1.02 
(-1.77) 
-1.17 
(-1.99) 
-1.07 
(-1.86) 
-0.43 
(-0.84) 
-0.85 
(-1.57) 
-1.11 
(-1.95) 
-0.70 
(-1.32) 
Federal  
prohibition 
-2.15 
(-1.37) 
-2.00 
(-1.31) 
-1.66 
(-1.09) 
-1.69 
(-1.14) 
-1.78 
(-1.19) 
-1.71 
(-1.10) 
-1.66 
(-1.10) 
-1.63 
(-1.08) 
Moralistic culture 
 
0.23 
(0.16) 
0.40 
(0.28) 
0.26 
(0.18) 
0.44 
(0.31) 
-0.54 
(-0.42) 
-0.42 
(-0.32) 
0.35 
(0.25) 
-0.42 
(-0.32) 
Moralistic with 
individualist strain 
1.57 
(1.03) 
1.55 
(1.02) 
1.50 
(0.98) 
1.54 
(1.01) 
0.47 
(0.34) 
0.85 
(0.60) 
1.51 
(.99) 
0.74 
(0.52) 
Individualist with 
moralistic strain 
-0.33 
(0.22) 
-0.16 
(-0.11) 
-0.08 
(-.05) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-1.08 
(-0.80) 
-0.80 
(-0.59) 
-0.03 
(-0.02) 
-0.79 
(-0.58) 
Individualist  
culture 
0.29 
(0.18) 
0.54 
(0.35) 
0.15 
(0.09) 
0.53 
(0.33) 
-0.90 
(-0.67) 
-0.94 
(-0.68) 
0.34 
(0.22) 
-0.90 
(-0.66) 
Individualist with 
traditionalist strain 
0.38 
(0.20) 
0.16 
(0.08) 
-0.07 
(-0.03) 
-0.09 
(-0.05) 
-0.53 
(-0.30) 
-0.30 
(-0.17) 
-0.10 
(-0.05) 
-0.45 
(-0.25) 
Traditionalist with 
individualist strain 
3.86 
(2.14) 
3.95 
(2.22) 
3.78 
(2.12)* 
3.94 
(2.20)* 
2.25 
(1.48) 
2.67 
(1.72) 
3.85 
(2.17) 
2.58 
(1.66) 
Traditionalist  
culture 
3.22 
(1.85) 
3.33 
(1.96) 
3.10 
(1.80) 
3.32 
(1.92) 
1.66 
(1.14) 
1.96 
(1.33) 
3.20 
(1.88)** 
1.89 
(1.28) 
Traditionalist with 
moralistic strain 
2.36 
(1.29) 
2.40 
(-3.10) 
2.33 
(1.28) 
2.43 
(1.33) 
1.20 
(0.73) 
1.57 
(0.93) 
2.37 
(1.30) 
1.46 
(0.87) 
Coefficients are on top; test statistics are in parentheses on bottom. 
* Statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence. 
** Statistically significant at the 90% level of confidence. 
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Table 4: Logistic Regressions: Dependent Variable as 
the Decision to Adopt the Exclusionary Rule 
Number of Observations: 848 | Equations 1–8 
Independent 
Variables 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
Neighboring-
state network 
variable 
0.69 
(0.17) 
0.58 
(0.60)   
1.10 
(1.17)    
Federal-circuit 
network  
variable 
3.19 
(1.82)** 
2.67 
(1.82)** 
3.86 
(2.67)* 
2.95 
(1.85)**  
2.89 
(2.06)*   
West-reporter 
network  
variable 
-4.82 
(-2.17)  
-4.57 
(-2.17)    
-2.61 
(-1.62)  
Census-region 
network  
variable 
0.62 
(0.37)   
-0.11 
(-0.07)    
1.19 
(1.04) 
Population 
 
-0.00 
(-0.34) 
-0.00 
(-1.34) 
-0.00 
(-0.20) 
-0.00 
(-1.19) 
-0.00 
(-0.89) 
-0.00 
(-1.27) 
-0.00 
(0.16) 
-0.00 
(-0.90) 
State  
prohibition 
0.31 
(0.33) 
-0.32 
(-0.40) 
0.42 
(0.47) 
-0.21 
(-0.27) 
0.13 
(0.16) 
-0.21 
(-0.27) 
0.95 
(1.07) 
0.22 
(0.29) 
Federal  
prohibition 
1.06 
(0.60) 
-0.07 
(-0.04) 
0.98 
(0.65) 
1.09 
(0.64) 
-.01 
(-0.01) 
-0.90 
(0.54) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
Moralistic  
culture 
-21.51 
(-16.53) 
-18.90 
(-11.30) 
-22.00 
(-13.78) 
-20.38 
(-12.37) 
-19.80 
(-15.75) 
-20.16 
(-15.91) 
-21.86 
(-13.71) 
-19.91 
(-13.06) 
Moralistic cul-
ture with indi-
vidualist strain 
-20.25 
(-16.24) 
-17.74 
(-11.62) 
-20.59 
(-13.72) 
-19.17 
(-13.14) 
-19.01 
(-16.29) 
-18.95 
(-16.05) 
-20.91 
(-14.17) 
-19.04 
(-13.43) 
Individualist 
culture with 
moralistic strain 
-21.89 
(blank) 
-19.17 
(-10.56) 
-22.43 
(-12.87) 
-20.69 
(-11.86) 
-20.19 
(blank) 
-20.46 
(blank) 
-22.23 
(-13.46) 
-20.17 
(-12.30) 
Individualist 
culture 
-22.46 
(-14.33) 
-19.03 
(-11.35) 
-22.62 
(-12.14) 
-20.37 
(-12.39) 
-19.58 
(-15.03) 
-20.16 
(-14.92) 
-21.73 
(-14.44) 
-19.65 
(-13.42) 
Individualist 
culture with tra-
ditionalist strain 
-18.11 
(-9.51) 
-16.15 
(blank) 
-18.18 
(-10.60) 
-17.35 
(blank) 
-17.96 
(-10.67) 
-17.13 
(-9.85) 
-19.09 
(blank) 
-17.48 
(blank) 
Traditionalist 
culture with in-
dividualist strain 
-18.27 
(-12.10) 
-15.53 
(-9.61) 
-18.74 
(-11.59) 
-17.08 
(-11.39) 
-17.08 
(-12.96) 
-16.85 
(-12.03) 
-19.40 
(-12.03) 
-17.13 
(-11.34) 
Traditionalist 
culture 
-21.65 
(-14.42) 
-18.46 
(-11.60) 
-22.00 
(-11.66) 
-19.89 
(-12.85) 
-19.77 
(-15.19) 
-19.69 
(-15.15) 
-21.93 
(-12.91) 
-19.91 
(-12.66) 
Traditionalist 
culture with 
moralistic strain 
-38.39 
(blank) 
-34.17 
(blank) 
-38.99 
(blank) 
-36.82 
(blank) 
-36.20 
(blank) 
-36.61 
(blank) 
-38.72 
(blank) 
-35.55 
(blank) 
Coefficients are on top; test statistics are in parentheses on bottom. 
* Statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence. 
** Statistically significant at the 90% level of confidence. 
 
 
